By D. George Boyce
This ebook lines the interplay of warfare and international relations and analyzes why the Falklands clash of 1982 engaged the British and Argentine humans in a deeply own manner. It additionally examines the translation of the battle in Britain, revealing how the war--a profitable one--was visible by way of its critics for example of "Thatcher's Britain." This "small conflict" exemplified what one historian calls "the myriad faces of struggle" and had--and has--resonances higher than its measurement.
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Extra info for The Falklands War (Twentieth Century Wars)
90, pp. 15–16] On 21 January 1981 pressure on Ridley and the Government was maintained. Nicholas Winterton asked for an assurance that ‘without the wholehearted support of the people of the Falkland Islands there would be no sell-out to Argentina’; [114, cols. 297–9] the emotive words ‘sell-out’ were repeated by Sir Ian Gilmour, who sought to assure critics that the leaseback proposal was ‘not on the agenda at the moment’. [114, 21 Jan. 1981, cols. 297–8] On 30 June SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 19 1981 the Foreign Ofﬁce ‘beseeched’ its Minister, Nicholas Ridley, to bring matters to a head by implementing the preferred option of ‘leaseback’; this, it was argued, would be in the best interests of the Islanders.
77, para. 195] Unfortunately, the Junta was more impressed by his added phrase that the British Government did not wish to escalate the military situation, but that the Argentine Government should be left in no doubt that ‘we are committed to the defence of British sovereignty in South Georgia and elsewhere’. [77, para. 195] On 31 March Intelligence reports were sent to the Ministry of Defence that the Argentines had set the early morning of 2 April for the day of action, [41, p. 367] though Intelligence still believed that the Argentine response was a ‘negotiating ploy’.
233] But still Intelligence held that no irrevocable decision to invade had as yet been made. It was at this stage that the British Government began to pull together some kind of concerted response to the Argentine threat. But the Government’s failure to anticipate such a threat sooner was not only because of Intelligence failures: a reading of the Buenos Aires Press from January 1982 onwards might have yielded some inkling of increasing Argentine impatience with British unwillingness to move negotiations forward, and even threats to use force to resolve the dispute.